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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for appeal: 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in its application of the "private attorney general" 
doctrine? An attorney fee decision that involves a question of law and a trial court's 
interpretation of binding case law is reviewed for correctness. See A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, [^6, 94 P.3d 270; Christiansen v. Farmers 
Ins. Exck, 2005 UT 21, f7, 116 P.3d 259. 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in determining that it had no authority to award 
attorneys' fees to the Culbertsons? An attorney fee decision that involves a question of 
law and a trial court's interpretation of binding case law is reviewed for correctness. See 
Whipple, 2004 UT 47,1f6; Christiansen, 2005 UT 21, f7. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No such provisions apply to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At issue is the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' (collectively referred to herein as 
"the Culbertsons") motion for an equitable award of attorneys' fees, the final remedy 
sought against the County in this extraordinary case. 
In 2001, this Court consolidated appeals from grants of summary judgment in this 
case and the related case of Johnson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., et ai, Civil No. 
960907123CV (3rd Dist. Ct.) (The "Hermes Action"), and found that the County and 
Hermes had violated various zoning and roadway ordinances and a Conditional Use 
Permit in building a shopping center adjacent to the Culbertsons' property. See 
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642 (Ex. "A" 
hereto). The Supreme Court remanded the case for entry of an appropriate remedy in the 
Culbertsons' favor. 
On remand in the Hermes Action, the district court granted the Culbertsons' 
motion for injunctive relief, which was affirmed by this Court. See Johnson v. Hermes 
Associates, Ltd, 2005 UT 82, 128 P.3d 1151, reh'g denied, 2006 Utah Lexis 21 (Utah 
2006) (Ex. "B" hereto). 
After that opinion was issued, the Culbertsons moved the trial court in this case for 
an award of attorneys' fees against the County based on the court's inherent equitable 
power and the "private attorney general" doctrine. [R. 3177, 3212-3219]. The 
Culbertsons sought recovery of their attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses 
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incurred as a result of being required to bring this action to obtain enforcement of the 
County zoning and roadway ordinances and Conditional Use Permit issued by the County 
to Hermes. In addition, because the County's refusal to enforce its ordinances and the 
Conditional Use Permit required Culbertson to sue Hermes to enjoin and remedy its 
violations, the Culbertsons also sought recovery from the County of their attorneys' fees, 
costs, and litigation expenses incurred in the Hermes Action. On May 12, 2006, the trial 
court heard oral argument and denied the motion, holding that the "private attorney 
general" doctrine did not apply and that it had no other power to award attorney fees. [R. 
3588 p. 24]. On June 5, 2006, the trial court entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs and Defendants' Motion to Strike. [R. 3569]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual history of this case spans more than a decade. The facts material to 
this appeal are extensively reported in this Court's opinions in Culbertson, 2001 UT 108 
and Johnson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., 2005 UT 82 , and are therefore only briefly 
summarized here. 
I. The Property 
The Culbertsons are owners of lots and homes located in the Fort Union area in 
Midvale, Utah (the "Property"). [R. 2831-32.] For more than 100 years and through five 
generations, members of the Griffiths and Croxford families have held title to and lived 
upon that property. [R. 2832.] The Griffiths/Croxford homestead, which is still located 
195478_2 DOC 7 
on the Property, was part of the original Fort Union and was constructed of hand-made 
adobe brick. [R. 2832.] In 1981, Plaintiff Alayna Culbertson and her young son moved 
from Oregon to Utah to care for her grandparents, Gene and Pearl Croxford, who were 
then in their eighties and still living on the Property. [R. 2832.] Ms. Culbertson has lived 
on the Property continuously for the last 22 years. [R. 2832.] 
II. The County's Involvement in the Shopping Center Construction 
Hermes and/or its successors ("Hermes") developed, own, and lease Phase III of 
the Family Center at Fort Union (the "Shopping Center"). [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^ 
2.] At the time the Shopping Center was being developed, it was located within 
unincorporated Salt Lake County. The County was the governmental entity responsible 
for approving all permits and plans relating to the development, and for ensuring that the 
development complied with all applicable County ordinances, including ordinances 
regulating streets, roads, and rights-of-way. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, f 2; R. 3059-61, 
3066.] 
Hermes was able to purchase the other property it was seeking for the Shopping 
Center, but the Culbertsons refused to sell their Property to Hermes. In order to proceed 
with the construction of the Shopping Center, Hermes needed the County to issue a 
Conditional Use Permit, and also needed the County to close certain public streets. 
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, K 2.] Therefore, Hermes agreed to defend and indemnify the 
County in the event any third party (such as the Culbertsons) filed a lawsuit relating to 
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the County's violation of any public street, road, or public right-of-way in the 
development area. [R. 2881, 2953, 2986.] 
On July 8, 1994, the County granted Hermes a Conditional Use Permit for the 
construction and development of the Shopping Center, [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, \ 5; R. 
3063-64, 3079-81, 3083], and on or about August 10, 1994, the County Commission 
adopted Ordinance No. 1275, which vacated and closed certain portions of North Union 
Avenue, over the Culbertsons' objections prior to and at the Commission's hearing on the 
subject. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, U 73; R. 3065, 3074-77, 3092-96, 2834, 2848-49.] 
Then, in June 1995, after Hermes improperly constructed 1070 East Street and 
North Union Avenue in violation of county roadway standards, the County Commission 
purported to grant Hermes post facto exceptions to those standards, approving a 
twenty-five-foot right-of-way and twenty-foot pavement width for the portion of North 
Union Avenue and 1070 East providing access to the Property and approving exceptions 
to the minimum roadway standards requiring a twenty-five-foot turning radius for the 
intersection of, and a cul-de-sac at the north end of North Union Avenue. [Culbertson, 
2001 UT 108, U 7; R. 3105.] 
III. The Culbertsons' Numerous Objections to the County 
In March and April 1994, the Culbertsons attended hearings held by the Planning 
Commission and filed an appeal regarding the proposed Shopping Center and the 
issuance of a Conditional Use Permit to Hermes. The County Commission, however, 
refused to hear the Culbertsons, appeal. [R. 3035-36.] 
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Then, on or about June 20, 1994 - before any construction had begun on the 
Shopping Center - the Culbertsons filed an action against the County challenging the 
adoption of Ordinance 1275. The Culbertsons alleged that the roadway proposed by 
Hermes and approved by the County adjacent to the Property violated the Roadway 
Ordinance, that the County was refusing to enforce the Roadway Ordinance, and that the 
County was refusing to enforce the conditions and requirements contained in the 
Conditional Use Permit issued for construction of the Shopping Center. [Culbertson, 
2001 UT108,H6n.4.] 
On or about October 3, 1994, the Culbertsons, through counsel, notified Hermes 
and the County that the footings for the Ernst Building encroached upon 1070 East Street, 
restricting the Culbertsons' lawful access to their Property, and that Hermes would be 
required to remove the footings. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, \ 6; R. 2835, 2851-52.] On 
or about October 5, 1994, the Culbertsons, through counsel, again notified Hermes and 
the County that the Ernst Building was being constructed within the right-of-way and 
requested that the County enforce its Roadway Ordinance and applicable building codes. 
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^  6; R. 2835, 2854-55.] 
On or about November 15, 1994, the Culbertsons, through counsel, notified 
Hermes and the County that 1070 East Street and the portion of North Union Avenue 
fronting the Culbertsons, Property violated the County Roadway Ordinance and that 
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Hermes was in violation of its Conditional Use Permit. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, f 6; 
R. 2836, 2856-57.] 
In April 1995, after Judge Iwasaki dismissed without prejudice the Culbertsons' 
claims relating to enforcement of the Roadway Ordinance, zoning ordinance, and the 
Conditional Use Permit issued to Hermes, the Culbertsons undertook and completed the 
three-step administrative remedy process requested by the County and outlined by the 
Court. The Culbertsons again advised the County of the ordinance violations and 
requested the County to enforce the ordinance. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, f 8; R. 2838.] 
In particular, in or about April 1995, the Culbertsons advised Ken Jones, the Director of 
Development Services for Salt Lake County, both orally and in writing, that Hermes was 
in violation of the Roadway Ordinance, the zoning ordinance, and the Conditional Use 
Permit issued for the Shopping Center. The Culbertsons urged the County to uphold 
these ordinances and requirements. [R. 2838, 2869-73.] 
In June 1995, prior to the County's approval of the post facto minimum roadway 
exceptions, the Culbertsons attended a public hearing on these proposed exceptions and 
reiterated their claims that Hermes and the County were proceeding in violation of the 
Roadway Ordinance, the zoning ordinance, and the Conditional Use Permit. [Culbertson, 
2001 UT 108,1 7; R. 3068-70, 3100, 3102-3114.] 
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IV. The Improperly Constructed Roadways Are Public Streets 
Both North Union Avenue and 1070 East are public streets. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 
108, ^J43 and 46.] Those roadways are used by Midvale City to provide public services, 
such as garbage collection and snow removal, by employees of the adjacent shopping 
center, and by members of the public. [R. 2833.] 
As constructed by Hermes, 1070 East Street and the portion of North Union 
Avenue fronting the Culbertsons' Property failed to comply with the Roadway Ordinance 
then in effect, and the Shopping Center failed to comply with the Conditional Use Permit. 
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ffi| 35-36.] 
V. Course of Proceedings in the Trial Court and the "Aunt Gloria" Action 
In 1995 and 1996, the Culbertsons re-filed this action against the County (the 
"County Action") and initiated a lawsuit against Hermes (the "Hermes Action"), seeking 
a declaration that the Shopping Center buildings were constructed in violation of the 
County zoning ordinance, Roadway Ordinance, and Conditional Use Permit because they 
were built without the proper setbacks, landscaping, and other applicable requirements, 
and seeking enforcement of those ordinances. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^  8.] 
In September 1997, while the County Action and Hermes Action were pending, 
Hermes paid for an out-of-state in-law relation of the Culbertsons, Gloria Croxford, to 
file a lawsuit challenging the Culbertsons' ownership of the Property (the "Aunt Gloria 
Action"). [R. 3118, 3123-26, 3137-39, 3141-42, 3144-45, 3147, and 3149-50.] Gloria 
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Croxford was represented by the same lawyers who represented Hermes in the Hermes 
Action, and Hermes paid her attorneys, fees. [R. 3118, 3123.] 
The Culbertsons were required to defend against the Aunt Gloria Action and 
necessarily incurred attorneys' fees, costs, and other litigation expenses in doing so. [R. 
3232.] The claims asserted by Gloria Croxford, and engineered by Hermes, were without 
merit. In September 1998, Third District Judge Anne Stirba granted summary judgment 
to defendants in the Aunt Gloria Action (the Culbertsons) and dismissed Gloria 
Croxfordrs claims with prejudice. [R. 3168-71.] 
VI. Course of Proceedings in the Utah Supreme Court 
In a unanimous opinion in 2001, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to the County and Hermes on the issue of whether the 
Shopping Center violated the applicable zoning and roadway ordinances and the 
Conditional Use Permit issued to Hermes. The Court held that Hermes and the County 
had, indeed, violated the County zoning and roadway ordinances and Conditional Use 
Permit by failing to provide the minimum setbacks, widths, turnarounds, turning radius, 
highback curbs, gutters, sidewalks, landscaping, and other features required by the 
ordinances and Conditional Use Permit. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, fflf 43, 46, 49, 56.] 
The Court remanded both cases to the district court "to award the Plaintiffs a remedy in 
accordance with this opinion." [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, % 57.] 
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VII. The Injunction Against Hermes 
Upon remand in the Hermes Action, the district court granted the Culbertsons a 
mandatory injunction on summary judgment requiring removal of the portions of the 
buildings that were unlawfully constructed and reconfiguration of the roadways in 
accordance with the zoning and roadway ordinances. [Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd,, 
2005 UT 82, % 9.] 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld this injunction on appeal, finding that because the 
roadways were public, "'the County must comply with the [Conditional Use Permit] and 
all other County zoning and roadway ordinances' and that to be in noncompliance would 
be a violation of the Conditional Use Permit and zoning and roadway ordinances," and 
that "the exceptions to the roadway standards were erroneously granted, which, 
consequently, placed Hermes in noncompliance and resulted in an ordinance violation." 
[Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd,, 2005 UT 82, }^ 28.] 
VIII. Public Interest in this Litigation 
The Culbertsons1 enforcement of the County's zoning and roadway ordinances has 
been the subject of considerable public interest and attention and reporting by the local 
news media. [R. 3229, 3251-60.] 
Following the Utah Supreme Court's unanimous affirmance of the trial court's 
mandatory injunction requiring demolition and reconfiguration of the Shopping Center 
Buildings, the Salt Lake Tribune reported that the County Commissioners who approved 
the development over the Culbertsons' repeated protests now admit they were wrong. [R. 
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3228, 3244-47.] The Tribune reported that former County Commissioner Brent Overson 
called his decision "the biggest mistake I ever made in my political career" and publicly 
acknowledged the harm done to Pearl Meibos and her family. [Id.] Then Salt Lake 
County Commissioner (now Council member) Randy Horiuchi also publicly apologized 
for "sacrific[ing] the good of a small group of people to the interests of the taxpayers of 
Salt Lake County." [R. 3228, 3249.] The Tribune quoted then Salt Lake County 
Commissioner (now Council member) Jim Bradley, who voted against the illegal 
development, describing the harm that the County and Hermes inflicted upon the 
Culbertsons as follows: "The developer built the project around them in an atrocious 
manner - a cinder-block fortress on three sides . . . They were bullied by the developer." 
[R. 3228,3244-47.] 
IX. Reasonableness of the Culbertsons'Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Expenses 
The Culbertsons' counsel submitted an affidavit specifying the attorneys' fees 
requested and demonstrating the reasonableness of those fees. [R. 3225-34.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court only denied the Culbertsons' motion because it wrongly interpreted 
the law to preclude it from awarding those fees unless the "private attorney general" 
doctrine applied. In finding that the "private attorney general" doctrine did not apply 
here, the trial court wrongly interpreted Stewart to require a comparison of the benefits 
received by the litigants and the public. This was an incorrect interpretation of Stewart 
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and its progeny, and the trial court's analysis cannot be reconciled with the correct 
interpretation of the law. Moreover, the trial court did not have to rely solely upon the 
"private attorney general" doctrine to award the Culbertsons' their attorneys' fees, as the 
trial court had the power to award the Culbertsons' their attorneys' fees under the court's 
"inherent equitable power to award attorneys' fees." Accordingly, the trial court's denial 
of the Culbertsons' motion for attorneys' fees was improper and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
"If there were a doctrine either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me 
authority to award attorneys' fees if the County willfully violated its own ordinances, I 
would not hesitate to do that in this case..." [R. 3588 p. 22.] This was the trial court's 
first statement after oral argument on the Culbertsons' motion for attorneys' fees, and is a 
clear indication of the trial court's view of the facts of this case. The Culbertsons are not 
asking this Court to substitute its factual conclusions, reweigh the equities, or rebalance 
the competing interests of justice. The trial court clearly felt that justice and equity 
would be served by requiring the County to pay the attorneys' fees incurred by the 
Culbertsons in enforcing the ordinances that the County willfully refused to enforce 
itself. 
However, the trial court concluded that the only possible authority for that award 
was the "private attorney general" doctrine, and the trial court determined that the 
Culbertsons did not meet the criteria of that doctrine after conducting a "benefits" 
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comparison - an incorrect test under that doctrine. The trial court's determination 
regarding the scope of its powers is a question of law, as is its interpretation of the test to 
be applied under this Court's ruling in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 
P.2d 759 (Utah 1994). See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 
47,1|6, 94 P.3d 270; Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 2005 UT 21,1(7, 116 P.3d 259. 
It is these two errors of law that the Culbertsons now appeal. 
I. The Trial Court Incorrectly Applied the Private Attorney General Doctrine. 
In denying the Culbertsons' motion, the trial court stated that the test for the 
private attorney general doctrine was ''whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the 
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefited the 
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefited the public at large." [R. 3571, ^|5]. 
This is not the correct analysis under the "private attorney general" doctrine, and 
therefore the trial court's conclusion and dismissal of the Culbertsons' motion was in 
error. 
In its leading decision on this issue, this Court stated that courts may award 
attorneys' fees to a party as a "private attorney general" when the '" vindication of a 
strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary costs in doing 
so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs' pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization.'" Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 
1994) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)). Subsequent cases 
have indicated that there are three elements to the private attorney general doctrine in 
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Utah: (1) whether a "strong or societally important public policy" has been vindicated, 
(2) whether the necessary costs incurred by the plaintiff "transcend" the plaintiffs 
pecuniary interest, and (3) whether the case is "extraordinary." See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 
783; Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, % 24, 100 P.3d 1151; Utahnsfor Better Dental 
Health-Davis v. Davis County, 2005 UT App 347, H 9, 121 P.3d 39. 
The trial court did not address these criteria in its ruling, but instead chose to 
compare the "benefits" received by the Culbertsons against the "benefits" received by the 
public. However, a benefits comparison is not an element of the "private attorney 
general" doctrine.1 While the trial court was not required to use the correct "buzzwords" 
for its decision to be upheld, it does need to address the substance of the legal doctrine 
under analysis. See Utahnsfor Better Dental Health, 2005 UT App 347, \ 9; cf 
Shipman, 2004 UT 44, ^26-27. Because the trial court's analysis and order did not 
address the substance of the "private attorney general" doctrine, the denial of the 
Culbertsons' motion was in error. 
A. The Trial Court's Benefits Analysis Does Not Address the Policy and Purpose of 
the Private Attorney General Doctrine. 
The "private attorney general" doctrine is an equitable doctrine, and therefore its 
overarching purpose is to further justice and equity. However, the doctrine has an 
1
 The source of the trial court's confusion may be that, in the Stewart opinion, this Court 
approved of an award of attorneys' fees under the "substantial benefit" doctrine as well as 
the "private attorney general" doctrine. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783. 
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additional and more specific purpose - to encourage potential private litigants to assert 
rights embodying important public interests that, due to the costs of litigation, might 
otherwise go unenforced. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 
402 (1968); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 
1974); Wilderness Society v. Morton, 161 U.S. App. D.C. 446, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (en banc); Stolberg v. Trustees for State Colleges, 474 F.2d 485, 489-491 (2d Cir. 
1973); Rowe, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW, 
1982 Duke L.J. 651, 662-63 (September 1982).2 
Unlike the "substantial benefit" doctrine or the "bad faith" doctrine, the "private 
attorney general" doctrine does not operate as a reward or a punishment. Rather, it is 
applied as an incentive to encourage parties to enter into certain litigation affecting public 
interests. To accomplish this objective, the tests employed in applying the doctrine must 
inquire into the party's pre-litigation motivations.3 See City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207 
Cal. App. 3d 1287, 1301 1305 (Cal App. 3rd Dist. 1989); Woodland Hills Residents Ass % 
2
 The United States Supreme Court has since held that federal courts may not award 
attorneys' fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine. See Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). However, because the Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted the "private attorney general" doctrine in this state, prior 
federal jurisprudence on the subject is instructive. 
3
 Of course, the language in Stewart that an important public policy must be "vindicated" 
implies that the outcome of the litigation must in some way further the public interest. 
Whether the plaintiff must be victorious in the actual lawsuit or whether a "catalyst" 
theory would apply in Utah is a question not raised in this appeal. 
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Inc. v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 934 (Cal. 1979). The benefits comparison used by 
the trial court fails to address this concern. 
B. The Trial Court's Order Did Not Address Whether a "Societally Important 
Public Policy" Was At Issue. 
The trial court correctly noted that an award of attorneys' fees is not appropriate in 
"every case where the law is vindicated in an action against a governmental agency." 
[R.3588 p. 3.] The first prong of the "private attorney general" doctrine addresses this 
concern, requiring the court to determine whether the public policy served by the 
litigation is sufficiently strong that encouragement of private litigation to enforce that 
policy is warranted. See Serrano, 569 P.2d p. 1314-15. The focus of this analysis is the 
importance of the public policy that is vindicated by the litigation. The plaintiffs stake 
in the litigation is irrelevant to this particular prong of the doctrine, and instead is 
addressed in the other elements of the doctrine. This is admittedly a difficult standard for 
a court to apply, illustrated by the trial court's difficulty in this case where it stated, with 
no further detail, that "90% of the benefit of the relief obtained inured to the plaintiffs as 
individuals." [R. 3572]. The trial court clearly found that there was a measurable public 
benefit conferred by this litigation (the remaining 10%). However, the trial court did not 
identify the public interests that it found were at issue, and failed to evaluate the societal 
importance of those interests. 
The trial court's benefits comparison did not achieve the same purpose as an 
evaluation of the importance of society's interest in the litigation. That the Culbertsons 
195478_2DOC 2 0 
are geographically closer than the rest of the "public" to the site of the zoning violation 
condoned by the County tells us nothing about the importance of the public policies at 
issue. Nor does the fact that the Culbertsons were found to have a special injury 
sufficient for standing to obtain an injunction. Indeed, if either of those facts were 
determinative to the "private attorney general" doctrine, zoning violations would be 
categorically removed from the ambit of the doctrine, as the two facts described above 
(and relied upon by the trial court in denying the Culbertsons' motion [R. 3588 pp. 3-4]] 
are always present in zoning litigation where injunctive relief is sought. Such a per se 
rule is inappropriate for this equitable doctrine, since there are circumstances, such as 
this, where litigation over a zoning issue warrants an award of attorney fees under the 
"private attorney general" doctrine. See, e.g., Starbirdv. County of San Benito, 176 Cal. 
Rptr. 149, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (by pursuing an action to invalidate land use permits 
and ordinances, Culbertson "vindicated important rights of the people of San Benito 
County which were ignored by the officials charged with enforcing them"); Friends of 
"B" Street v. City ofHayward, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding 
attorneys fees appropriate under private attorney general doctrine where Plaintiffs 
challenged a road project that did not comply with state law and local ordinances). 
A closer analysis of Stewart is helpful in this regard. In Stewart, the court found 
that the Public Service Commission had violated the law in the way it approved certain 
rates to be charged by US West. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 773. No money was awarded 
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by that decision, merely a reversal of the Commission's approval of the rates. This Court 
approved an award of attorneys' fees in that case under the "private attorney general" 
doctrine if no monetary recovery was made. See id. at 783-84. The actual monetary 
benefit that each particular member of the public reaped from the Stewart litigation (if 
any) was relatively small, likely averaging only a few dollars per month. Nevertheless, 
the Utah Supreme Court found that an important public policy was vindicated by the 
litigation. See id. Presumably the Utah Supreme Court would have reached the same 
result even if one of the named plaintiffs in Stewart had an exceptionally large phone bill. 
The "special injury" or specific concrete benefit received by virtue of litigation is not the 
focus of the "private attorney general" doctrine. The "important public policies" at issue 
in Stewart, rather, were in remedying the "abdication by the Commission of its statutory 
duties" and preventing US West "from using its monopoly power to charge exploitive 
rates." Id. at 771 and 774. 
The parallels to this case are clear. The County not only "abdicated" its role as the 
enforcer of zoning regulations, it was knowingly and intentionally complicit in the 
violation of those ordinances. See Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^ [56 ("By allowing Hermes 
to proceed, the County stepped into the quagmire we condemned in Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. City of Springville, where we emphasized that local zoning 
authorities 'are bound by the same terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances 
and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof" (quoting 
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Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 729 P.2d 332, 337-38 (Utah 
1999))). In addition, the public policies served by zoning ordinances, which were 
enforced by the Culbertsons in this litigation, are of enormous importance: preserving 
the aesthetics of the community, safety of the citizens when traveling the roadways of the 
community, and access by police, firemen, emergency personnel, and sanitation for all of 
the County's current and future residents. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-102; Salt Lake 
Co. Ord. § 19.02.020. That the Culbertsons may drive on the public roadways they 
vindicated more frequently than other members of the public is irrelevant. 
Because the trial court's analysis and order failed to evaluate the "important public 
policies" served by this litigation, the denial of the Culbertsons' motion was in error and 
should be reversed. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Determine Whether the Litigation Expenses 
Transcended Culbertson's Pecuniary Interest. 
The second test for the "private attorney general" doctrine is a comparison of the 
costs of the litigation against the Culbertsons' expected pecuniary benefit. Stewart, 885 
P.3d at 783. Unlike the test used by the trial court, this prong of the doctrine tests the 
pre-litigation motives of the plaintiff by requiring the court to determine "whether the 
individual stake of the litigant would have been sufficient in its own right to have 
motivated his participation in the litigation." Drew, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 1305. 
A comparison of the costs of pursuing this action and the injunctive relief claim of 
the Hermes Action against the Culbertsons1 individual financial stake in the outcome is 
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simple and striking. The Culbertsons had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the 
County Action, and no prospect of a pecuniary windfall. They simply sought to have the 
County do what it was mandated to do by state statute and County ordinance - enforce 
the County's zoning and roadway ordinances and Conditional Use Permit. Likewise, the 
Culbertsons had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the injunctive relief claim in the 
Hermes Action. The Culbertsons' only other stake in the outcome of the litigation, i.e. 
their interest in safe and accessible roadways and the aesthetics of the community, are 
interests the Culbertsons' share with every other resident of the County. Notwithstanding 
this complete lack of any expectation of a monetary reward at the end of the day, the 
Culbertsons have incurred attorneys' fees and costs in at least the amount of $451,142.78. 
[R. 3231]. 
The trial court's benefits analysis failed to include any comparison of the costs of 
this litigation to the Culbertsons' pecuniary interest, and therefore the trial court's 
decision and order was in error and should be reversed. 
D. The Trial Court Did Not Determine Whether This Case Is Extraordinary. 
Finally, the trial court made no finding that this case was not "extraordinary."4 
This Court has stated that the private attorney general doctrine is limited in application to 
"extraordinary cases." Stewart, 885 P.3d at 783. It has also described the test for 
Of course, had the trial court made such a finding, it would have been astonishing, 
given the language of this Court's prior opinions in this case and the trial court's own 
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determining whether a case is "extraordinary" - "that 'but for' Plaintiffs action, the ill 
could not have been cured." Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, \ 24, 100 P.3d 1151. Here, 
it is the very public entity charged with enforcing zoning and roadway ordinances that 
willfully refused to do so. In these situations, "the necessity of private enforcement is 
obvious ... private citizens alone must 'guard the guardians' and the disparity in legal 
resources is likely to be greatest." Drew, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 711. 
In this respect, the facts of this case eclipse those of Stewart, because the County 
not only willfully refused to enforce its own ordinances, it systematically engaged in 
conduct designed to displace the governmental obligation of enforcement of laws onto 
the shoulders of the Culbertsons. The County entered into an indemnification agreement 
with Hermes whereby Hermes was to defend and indemnify the County in the event any 
third party filed a legal challenge relating to the County's violation of any public street, 
road, or public right-of-way in the development area. [R. 2881, 2953 and 2986.] After 
securing Hermes' indemnification, the County ignored the Culbertsons1 repeated oral and 
written notices that Hermes was violating the conditions of its Conditional Use Permit 
and the County's zoning and roadway ordinances, and the County refused the 
Culbertsons' repeated requests that it enforce its zoning and roadway ordinances and 
statements that the County willfully violated ordinances and that the trial court would not 
have hesitated to award attorneys' fees if it had felt it had the authority. 
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Conditional Use Permit against Hermes. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^  6-8 and n.4; R. 
2835-36, 2838, 2851-52, 2854-57, 2869-73, 3035-36, 3068-70, 3100 and 3102-3114.] 
Finally, after allowing Hermes to construct the substandard roadway in front of the 
Culbertsons' property, the County attempted to excuse its unlawful conduct by granting 
Hermes after-the-fact exceptions to its roadway ordinance, remarkable conduct that this 
Court had little trouble striking down as illegal. See Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^ | 49. 
The County's actions made it necessary for the Culbertsons to pursue this lawsuit 
and the Hermes Action, and to defend against the Hermes-orchestrated Aunt Gloria 
Action, if the County zoning and roadway ordinances were to be enforced. Enforcement 
of the County's ordinances is a legal obligation that should have been assumed by the 
County. When the County illegally abdicated this obligation, the Culbertsons had no 
choice but to step in and essentially perform a governmental function in enforcing those 
ordinances. This is precisely the type of case that meets the Utah Supreme Court's 
definition of "extraordinary" and warrants an award of attorneys' fees under the private 
attorney general doctrine. Had the County simply fulfilled its duty at the outset, this 
expense would have been avoided. It is only fair and equitable for the County to bear the 
cost that its intransigence has imposed on the Culbertsons and to repay the 
disproportionate burden that the Culbertsons have borne in doing what the County would 
not. 
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II. The Trial Court Erred in Determining That It Had No Authority to Award 
Attorneys' Fees in This Case. 
The trial court focused its analysis to the question of whether fees could be 
awarded under the "private attorney general" doctrine5, concluding that doctrine was the 
only possible authority it had to award attorneys' fees in this case. However, the "private 
attorney general" doctrine is simply a subset of a larger equitable power recognized by 
this Court — that "in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has 
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate 
in the interest of justice and equity." Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 (Utah 1994) (citing Hall v. 
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)); see also Utahns For Better Dental Health, 2005 UT App 
347, If 6; Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App. 105, J 23, 46 P.3d 233. 
This Court has identified many categories of cases in which an equitable award of 
attorneys' fees is appropriate: where a party acts vexatiously or in bad faith, certain class 
actions, certain actions by a beneficiary against a trustee, the "substantial benefit" 
doctrine, the "common fund" and the "private attorney general" doctrine. However, 
those categories do not limit the trial court's authority, but are merely examples of 
circumstances that warrant the exercise of this power. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782-83; 
see also Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Jensen is particularly 
significant in this context. In Jensen, the plaintiff was appointed guardian of the 
5
 The trial court also stated that the third party litigation and "common fund" doctrines 
were inapplicable. [R. 3570.] Neither of those doctrines is at issue in this appeal. 
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defendant's minor child and sued the defendant for child support. See Jensen, 892 P.2d 
at 1053. The trial court awarded the plaintiff attorneys fees, and although the Court of 
Appeals noted that there was no statutory or contractual basis for this award, the Court of 
Appeals, citing to Stewart, affirmed the award of attorneys' fees based upon the court's 
"inherent equitable power" and the specific facts of the case: 
In this case, Jensen not only had to provide support for David, but was also 
required to finance legal fees to compel Bowcut to fulfill his statutory 
obligations and duties to David. Similar to the examples set forth above, 
Jensen expended her time and resources for the benefit of another-in this 
case, for the support of a minor. We believe that under these circumstances, 
equity demands the award of attorney fees. Moreover, the award of fees in 
this case was, in reality, simply a part of the child support award itself since 
the fees went to reimburse Jensen for her "support" of David. Therefore, 
while the trial court improperly based its award of attorney fees on statutory 
grounds, we nevertheless affirm the award based on principles of equity 
and justice as they relate to the specific circumstances of this case. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
A trial court has the authority to award attorneys' fees in any case in which justice 
and equity require such an award. Certainly the facts of this case justify the exercise of 
this power. Here, the Culbertsons notified the County of the violations of zoning and 
roadway ordinances, fully expecting the County to do its job and enforce its own laws. 
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ffi| 6-8 and n.4; R. 2835-36, 2838, 2851-52, 2854-57, 2869-
73, 3035-36, 3068-70, 3100 and 3102-3114.] In the face of these repeated notices, the 
County not only refused to enforce its ordinances, but affirmatively assistedHermes in 
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violating those ordinances by granting illegal exceptions and attempting to ratify 
violations after they had occurred. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ffl| 43, 46, 49, 56.] 
The balance of the equities are not even in question here. As the trial court stated, 
"[i]f there were a doctrine either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me authority 
to award attorneys' fees if the County willfully violated its own ordinances, I would not 
hesitate to do that in this case..." [R. 3588 p. 22 (emphasis added).] If this Court finds 
that this case is not encompassed by the "private attorney general" doctrine because the 
Culbertsons suffered a "special injury" sufficient to obtain injunctive relief, then an entire 
category of deserving plaintiffs will be effectively denied a remedy and will be denied 
recourse when their government fails them. A more inequitable result is hard to imagine, 
and this Court should specifically recognize that plaintiffs who must take on the type of 
public enforcement role forced on the Culbertsons here, in the face of opposition from the 
very government charged with protecting their rights, are entitled to recover their 
attorneys' fees from that governmental entity. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of the Culbertsons' motion for attorneys' fees should be 
reversed. The trial court denied the Culbertsons' motion because it wrongly interpreted 
the law to preclude it from awarding those fees unless the "private attorney general" 
doctrine applied, and it wrongly interpreted Stewart to require a comparison of the 
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benefits received by the litigants and the public in applying that doctrine. Both of these 
conclusions are incorrect as a matter of law and should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (^ day of December, 2006. 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MAY 12, 2006 
2 JUDGE ANTHONY B. QUINN PRESIDING 
3 P-4V-0-€-fi-E--BHE--M-6--S 
4 THE COURT: Let'S go on the record in the matter of 
5 Culbertson vs. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake. 
6 Please state your appearances. 
7 MR. HUNT: Good morning Your Honor, Jeff Hunt and 
8 David Reymann for the plaintiffs. 
9 MR. TSAKALOS: T. J. Tsakalos for the County, Your 
10 Honor and with me is Don Hansen. 
11 THE COURT: All right. We're here today on the 
12 plaintiff's Motion to Awarded Attorney's fees and costs 
13 associated really with both this action and the action that was 
14 consolidated against Hermes, at least for purposes of appeal. 
15 I have read all the memos that have been submitted with respect 
16 to this motion. I've read most of the cases. I've read 
17 selectively from the exhibits. I'm going to tell you what my 
18 tentative views are and then give you a chance to respond. 
19 I guess I start with two propositions that in my mind 
20 set forth the dilemma that I face as a judge in this case. 
21 First is a sense of almost outrage at the County's conduct in 
22 this case which the Supreme Court of Utah had characterized as 
23 a willful, deliberate violation of the law. Despite being 
24 placed on notice for years that their conduct was in violation 
25 of the law, their insistence on going forward with providing 
1 exceptions to the law for the purposes of allowing this 
2 development to go forward is really, really troubling. 
3 The second proposition is that I take a conservative 
4 view of my power as a district court judge and struggle to find 
5 an exception to the general rule that unless provided for by 
6 contract or statute, that I don't have the authority to grant 
7 attorney's fees to prevailing party in civil litigation. 
8 The first theory that's advanced that would allow me 
9 to grant attorney's fees in this case is the Private Attorney 
10 General Exception and I really don't find that particularly 
11 applicable to the facts in this case because I believe that the 
12 specific results obtained in this case primarily benefitted the 
13 plaintiffs and not the public as a whole. I accept the general 
14 proposition that whenever the power of government is restrained 
15 by the acts of its citizens and brought in conformance with the 
16 law, that every member of the public benefits to some degree 
17 but I don't believe that the Private Attorney General Exception 
18 is intended to extend to all those situations where the power 
19 of government is restrained by civil litigation filed on behalf 
20 of particular plaintiffs. If it included all of those j 
21 situations, then the dog license analogy advanced by the County 
22 would be an apt analogy because if, contrary to law, a dog 
23 licese were granted or denied, that would be as arbitrary a use 
24 of government power as that which we are seeing in this case 
25 and there's a public interest in that not happening and it 
1 relates to the safety of the public because a dog license 
2 insures that rabies vaccinations occur and other things and so 
3 to some extent, every member of the public would benefit by the 
4 restraint of government power in that case. But there has to 
5 be a way to draw a line so that not every case where the law is 
6 vindicated in an action against a governmental agency, 
7 attorney's fees are awarded and I think that the line that has 
8 been drawn by the Supreme Court in the Stewart case with 
9 respect to the Private Attorney General Exception is you look 
10 to the specific relief obtained and you determine whether that 
11 specific relief benefitted the public as a whole or whether the 
12 benefit was primarily for the benefit of those individual 
13 plaintiffs. 
14 Interestingly, plaintiffs in this case succeeded in 
15 getting an injunction in the Hermes action and took the 
16 position in that case that they suffered a special private 
17 injury. If you look at the Johnson case which I've got here 
18 someplace. This is on page 4, at least of the Lexus, it looks 
19 like it's Page 14 of the Pacific Report. The Supreme Court 
20 states in that case, "We have defined special damages in the 
21 context of zoning violation of damage over and above the public 
22 injury which may be caused by the violation of the zoning 
23 ordinance. The damages need only different kind or be 
24 substantially more than those of the general community. As the 
25 only landowner surrounded on three sides by Hermes expansion 
1 Appellees have obviously suffered a different and more 
2 substantial impact than any other landowners near the Family 
3 Center. The record unequivocally reflects the fact that 
4 Appellees are the only homeowners whose residential property is 
5 within feet of the shopping center and who have been affected 
6 in kind by Hermes' substandard roadway construction and non-
7 compliance." Well, it goes on but at the plaintiff's urging, 
8 the Supreme Court makes a finding of specific and discreet 
9 injury to these plaintiffs as opposed to the public at large as 
10 a condition to approving injunctive relief in this case which, 
11 it's not a mirror image of the issue that I'm facing but it's 
12 close because I would have to find in order to grant attorney's 
13 fees that the specific relief - this is my view of the law, 
14 that the specific relief obtained in this case benefitted the 
15 public as a whole virtually to the same extent as they did the 
16 plaintiffs in this case and for that reason I don't think that 
17 Private Attorney General Exception applies. 
18 Secondly, with respect to the third party litigation 
19 section, that is not a reflection of the Court's equitable 
20 power to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party in limited 
21 circumstances. That is simply a measure of damage that has 
22 been recognized in limited circumstances whereas one of the 
23 items of damage that a plaintiff may obtain, he can obtain the 
24 costs of pursuing litigation against a third party if it's 
25 proximately caused by the negligent act of another or if it's, 
1 in the contract section, it's a consequential damage of the 
2 breach of contract or another* I don't think this case, number 
3 one, fits into that but even more importantly, having checked 
4 the complaint in this case, the corrected amended complaint 
5 which I believe is the most recent complaint filed, no claim 
6 for damages at all. So I can't simply award - this is a damage 
7 claim and I can't award damages where none were prayed in the 
8 complaint. So anyway, that's my tentative assessment. 
9 Mr. Hunt, I'll give you a chance to demonstrate the 
10 error of my analysis. 
11 MR. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor. I want to thank 
12 you for your comments. It will help focus my argument. I 
13 neglected to introduce my client, Pearl Mybois, who is in court 
14 today as well and seated to her right is her father, Blaine 
15 Johnson as well and I wanted to introduce them to the Court. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. It's nice to have them here. 
17 MR. HUNT: Your Honor, also I may make reference to 
18 two demonstrative exhibits which are in the record, have been 
19 admitted in this case and I'd like to turn those around if I 
20 may. 
21 THE COURT: Of course. 
22 MR. HUNT: I've shown these to counsel prior to Your 
23 Honor coming on the bench. Just to introduce the exhibits, 
24 this is the plat that was attached to the Conditional Use 
25 Permit that the County issued to Hermes to construct the 
1 shopping center addition. So what this does is depicts the 
2 roadways and the Croxford property in relation to the shopping 
3 center development. The Croxford property is identified there, 
4 shaded in yellow, 1070 E. Street which the Supreme Court found 
5 was a public street is right here abutting the west and North 
6 Union Avenue which the Supreme Court found is a public street 
7 abuts to the north of the property. So these are the roadways 
8 and the property to give Your Honor a visual depiction and then 
9 this, of course, is a photograph taken by Pearl Mybois at 
10 approximately 1999 after the construction had occurred in a 
11 photograph, before the construction had occurred and you can 
12 see here what the problem was here building the shopping center 
13 directly on the roadway with no setbacks, sidewalks, which the 
14 Supreme Court found was illegal. 
15 I'd like to focus on the Private Attorney General 
16 Doctrine and that specific requirement that Your Honor has 
17 honed in on which I agree is at the heart of our motion and 
18 which I'd like an opportunity to try to change Your Honor's 
19 mind on. This was outrageous conduct engaged in by the County 
20 and Hermes which the Court in a very unusual opinion strongly 
21 condemned in the Hermes and Culbertson opinions and I would 
22 submit to Your Honor that even taking a conservative view of 
23 Your Honor's powers, it's clear under the Stewart case that you 
24 do have inherent equitable power to make an award of attorney's 
25 fees and costs when you deem appropriate in the interests of 
1 justice and equity* Those are the words of the Supreme Court 
2 in the Stewart case and they went on in that case to say, one 
3 of the ways you can do that is the Private Attorney General 
4 Doctrine where in essence the plaintiff, the litigant has to 
5 take on the role of the attorney general to obtain enforcement 
6 of the laws and that's exactly the case that we have here, Your 
7 Honor. 
8 My clients did everything within their power to get 
9 Salt Lake County to enforce the law in this case. This was not 
10 a case like a dog license or a challenge of a refusal to issue 
11 a dog license or even a challenge, as the County makes argument 
12 in their brief, of the issuance of the CUP, the Conditional Use 
13 Permit. We never challenged that. We never said, County, 
14 don't issue the CUP. We never said, County, don't approve the 
15 development. We never said, don't issue the dog license. That 
16 is not the analogy to this case. What my client said is first 
17 of all, if you're going to build the shopping center addition, 
18 you can't do it with tax subsidies and they took that case to 
19 the Utah Supreme Court and won. They invalidated the RDA and 
20 there was a ruling that tax subsidies could not be used for the 
21 shopping center expansion. After that they went ahead with the 
22 development, bought out all of the homeowners adjacent to the 
23 development with the exception of one, my clients. The 
24 descendants of the Croxford and Griffiths family who have been 
25 living on this property for 100 years refused to sell. So what 
1 did they do? The enveloped the property on three sides with 
2 commercial buildings, 200,000 square feet of commercial 
3 buildings, in excess of 25 feet just literally casting a shadow 
4 over the property because they built it right on the road. 
5 Before they did that, before the County allowed them 
6 to do that, my clients said, County, we understand that they 
7 can build their shopping center addition but they need to obey 
8 the laws. They need to obey the zoning and roadway ordinances 
9 that are in effect. I think that's what distinguishes this 
10 case. This is a case where we have, and this is what makes it 
11 a more general application. All property owners that are 
12 impacted by development in this state including this county 
13 should have the right to rely on the government authority that 
14 has enforcement power to protect their rights, to protect their 
15 rights with respect to that development, to make sure that it 
16 complies with the existing public safety laws which are 
17 intended to benefit not just the property owners that live 
18 right next to it, but everybody, everybody that is in the 
19 jurisdiction of those ordinances and laws has the benefit of 
20 them and that's all my clients did. They said, County, do not 
21 allow them to build their buildings on the roadway without the 
22 setbacks, without the sidewalks, without the legally required 
23 width, without the legally required turning radius. That's 
24 illegal. Stop them. And the County said no. They not only 
25 said no, after they tore out the road, they went in and tried 
8 
1 to fix it with their after-the-fact exceptions to the roadway 
2 ordinance which the Supreme Court condemned. 
3 And my argument to Your Honor is simply that there is 
4 a broader public policy at issue here in allowing residents to 
5 rely on the government authority that has enforcement 
6 responsibility to do their job and in this case, they didn't do 
7 their job and why didn't they do their job? One of the reasons 
8 we submit is because they sought contractual indemnification 
9 from the party that they were suppose to enforce those 
10 ordinances against and — 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Hunt, let me focus you on what I 
12 think is missing in this case because like I said before, I 
13 think whenever citizens take action to check unreasonable use 
14 of government power, we all benefit. If they had, as the 
15 specific relief that they had obtained in this case - and I'm 
16 not saying that it would have been a relief that's available or 
17 that would have been a good injunction, but if they had gotten 
18 an injunction saying that the County may never again approve a 
19 development without appropriate setbacks and roadways that 
20 comply with law, that's a good argument for application of 
21 Private Attorney General Exception but the specific relief they 
22 got in this case really only benefits them as owners of the 
23 property. That's where I'm trying to draw the line. 
24 MR. HUNT: Sure, and I'd like to suggest that the 
25 impact was broader than that and here's why. After we get 
1 these roads reconfigured after Hermes complies with the Court's 
2 injunction, we're going to have roadways that are of legal 
3 width with the legal turning radius here and a legal turnaround 
4 here with setbacks and side blocks and if you look at the 
5 benefit, every member of the public - these are public roads. 
6 They tried to argue they were private roads but they're not. 
7 The Supreme Court said these are public roads. Every member of 
8 the public that drives along these roadways, every emergency 
9 personnel that uses those roadways, sanitation, snowplow 
10 drivers, ambulances will be able to have access that is on 
11 legally required roads with legal turnarounds and legal widths, 
12 legal setbacks. It's obviously much safer for members of the 
13 public to walk on sidewalks than it is on the middle of the 
14 road. 
15 Now, you may say well, but it's a dead-end street, 
16 the only people that go down there would be people that have an 
17 interest in going to this property. That's not quite true. 
18 We've got commercial buildings here that have access for the 
19 loading docks and a trash compacting facility. So we have 
20 vehicles that use that. There's a safety interest in the 
21 public at large in making sure that those vehicles travel on 
22 roadways that are safe and in fact, Your Honor, this inures to 
23 the benefit of every single family that is going to live on 
24 this property in the future. Right now it's my client's, 
25 that's true, that as the Court said, they were the ones that 
10 
1 were disproportionally impacted by the violation but there are 
2 going to be other families living on that property. Right now 
3 it's Elaina Culbertson. She's lived there for 25 years. She 
4 moved there in 1981 to care for her 80-year old grandparents 
5 who were living on the homestead. But there are going to be 
6 other families there and people that travel along that roadway, 
7 those public streets are all going to benefit, every member of 
8 the public. These are public roads that every member of the 
9 public has the right to travel and I think that the safety 
10 illustration, the safety issue with those streets was 
11 illustrated just last month when there was an individual who 
12 called for 911 on the property and because of the 
13 configuration, illegal reconfiguration of these roads, couldn't 
14 find the property, got there too late and the individual died. 
15 It was covered in the newspapers last month. That's just a 
16 dramatic illustration of the unsafe condition of these roadways 
17 and because of the relief that my client sought, not just sort 
18 of the general policy, I mean, there's different levels of 
19 generality, you're right, that you can look at this. You can 
20 look at it in terms of enforcing the laws generally when an 
21 entity has been put on notice they're violating them, whether 
22 that indicate an important social policy, but also at a more 
23 micro level, the specific relief here is going to benefit all 
24 members of the public, all future people who live on that 
25 property and you can't, you know, who knows where these road 
11 
1 are going to go eventually? But when they are extended if they 
2 ever are, they're going to be the legally required widths and 
3 turning radius, etc., that comply with the ordinances. 
4 And I think to address Your Honor's point about the 
5 special damage and the Supreme Court opinion in Culbertson, I 
6 thought about that and I think it's important to draw the 
7 distinction between what the Court was talking about there and 
8 what we're talking about here. The Court was talking about the 
9 special damages that my clients were required to prove to have 
10 standing. It was a standing analysis, in order to get the 
11 injunctive relief that we were requesting and what the Court 
12 said was, we want to appropriately narrow the class of people 
13 that are entitled to that type of relief and if you're out 
14 somewhere else in the county, you shouldn't be able to come in 
15 say Hermes ought to tear their illegally constructed buildings 
16 down. You need to have some kind of special injury to yourself 
17 over and above the general public and we obviously do. We're 
18 not denying that, that we're impacted in a way that is more 
19 severe than the general public, but I don't think that is 
20 necessarily the same thing as saying that the public is not 
21 deriving a benefit by the relief that we obtained in this case. 
22 I don't think that's the same thing. If that were the case, 
23 then every time a party was entitled to injunctive relief, 
24 mandatory injunctive relief to require buildings to be torn 
25 down, to remedy a violation of the zoning ordinance, you'd 
12 
1 never be entitled to attorney's fees under the Private Attorney 
2 General Doctrine and I think that's a harsh, inequitable 
3 result. I don't think that was the result that the Court 
4 intended in Stewart and I don't think that they, frankly were 
5 thinking about this particular case in Stewart but it is an 
6 extraordinary case and they did say it takes the extraordinary 
7 case and the Shipman case later, they say it takes the 
8 extraordinary case. And my argument that it is extraordinary 
9 but in a different way. You're right, it didn't create a fund 
10 that's going to benefit a large group of people. It didn't 
11 create a law or a rule of the court that says that all 
12 government entities need to comply with their zoning laws but I 
13 think that they didn't say that because it's self-evident. I 
14 mean, the government entities are charged with enforcing the 
15 law and in this case they were put on notice that they weren't 
16 doing that and they went ahead anyway. They went forward 
17 anyway. For 10 years we had to fight them to finally get to 
18 the place where we should have been in 1995 and I think that 
19 that process of saying that not just the developers but as Mr. 
20 Horouchi called them in his opinion column in the Tribune that 
21 small groups of people, he called us a small group of people 
22 that were sacrificed for the good of the taxpayers. Small 
23 groups of people are entitled to the benefit of the law too, 
24 not just developers that indemnify the County against risks 
25 like this lawsuit which by the way County has filed as Your 
13 
1 Honor probably know, a third party complaint against Hermes 
2 under that indemnification provision saying if the Court awards 
3 any fees, those fees should be paid by Hermes, pursuant to that 
4 contractual indemnification and I think there is a public 
5 policy in vindicating that aspect of the case, that a County 
6 simply can't abdicate its enforcement authority to a private 
7 developer and say, you know, if it all shakes out bad, you guys 
8 are on the hook. There ought to be a policy which I think was 
9 vindicated in this case and would be with an award of fees that 
10 the County needs to take responsibility for its illegal actions 
11 and this isn't a discretionary call by the County that we're 
12 challenging. It's not like they made a zoning decision and the 
13 court determined it was arbitrary and capricious and overturned 
14 it. That's not this case. This case is, yeah, you can build 
15 your shopping center but, you know, you can't squeeze these 
16 people like you did. You can't envelope them like you did in 
17 violation of the existing laws and that's what we think is the 
18 public policy that we've vindicated. It can't be - we think 
19 it's inequitable to say that just because it's a dead end 
20 street that we don't qualify for the Private Attorney General 
21 Doctrine in the award of fees in this case. I mean, I guess 
22 that's one way you could look at it if the street went through, 
23 more cars would be going along it. I don't think that that's 
24 the relevant fact, at least that's what we would suggest to 
25 Your Honor. It's the fact that it's a public road, it's a 
14 
1 public right-of-way, public sidewalks and every member of the 
2 public once those are constructed will have the benefit of 
3 safer streets and safer sidewalks and safer access for the 
4 emergency personnel and that public safety is recognized in 
5 Salt Lake County's own ordinance which is the ordinance that we 
6 vindicated in this case, the safety from fire and other 
7 dangers, adequate light and air, protection of the urban 
8 environment. 
9 So I understand Your Honor's concern. It is the 
10 concern with the application in this case but I think if you 
11 look at it both on the broader policy level and then the 
12 specific results that we obtained here, not just for our 
13 clients but for every member of the public, we qualify under 
14 the Private Attorney General Doctrine for recovery of fees and 
15 this isn't a far fetched notion. We cited the Court to the 
16 other cases in California that have applied the doctrine in 
17 this context and the — 
18 THE COURT: They have a specific statute in 
19 California that's broad enough to cover land use decisions 
20 which we are lacking here in Utah. 
21 MR. HUNT: I would just argue by analogy that the 
22 Court in Stewart did rely heavily on the Cerono decision in 
23 California for recognition of the doctrine and the other 
24 California cases we cited did apply it in the context of zoning 
25 violations and ordinance violations. 
15 
1 So, you know, I don't think it's the dog license 
2 case. This is a truly extraordinary situation where you had 
3 the entity that was responsible for protecting the public 
4 including my clients, refusing to enforce the law after being 
5 put on notice and then trying to fix it with their after-the-
6 fact exceptions. There's an interest in vindicating a result 
7 that condemns that kind of conduct that says, you know, that 
8 kind of conduct won't be tolerated. These people have rights 
9 too and everybody that lives next to shopping centers or 
10 commercial developments have rights that need to be protected. 
11 We think we've indicated that interest in this case and we've 
12 indicated the more practical public safety, health and safety 
13 interest of driving on safe roadways. 
14 And just finally, Your Honor, just to touch on sort 
15 of the balancing points here, weighing my client's personal 
16 gain here versus the cost that they incurred in prosecuting 
17 this litigation. They're not getting any pecuniary benefit. 
18 The only thing that they ever wanted was compliance with the 
19 law. They wanted a road that was legally as wide as it should 
20 have been with legally required setbacks with some landscaping, 
21 sidewalk, the turning radius that should have been in the cul-
22 de-sac. And now we're going to get that as a result of the 
23 Hermes litigation which we were - they were a necessary part. 
24 We had to sue Hermes to get this relief and that's why we think 
25 we're entitled for the Hermes fees as well under the equitable 
16 
1 theory. This isn't a result that's benefitting my clients 
2 financially. It's just merely getting compliance with the law. 
3 And, Your Honor, finally, I would just submit that 
4 the Court does have legal authority to award this remedy if you 
5 determine that it's proper under the analysis, the Private 
6 Attorney General Doctrine analysis and in thinking about that, 
7 it really is an equitable remedy and if you think about who 
8 should bear the financial consequences of the County's illegal 
9 conduct in this case, should it be the homeowners who did 
10 everything that they could for 10 years to get the County to 
11 stop and to get the County to enforce the law or should it be 
12 the County who should have undertaken that duty in the first 
13 place? We'd just simply submit if you weigh those choices, 
14 that justice and equity argue for an award in this case. Thank 
15 you. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hunt. I'll hear from the 
17 County. 
18 MR. TSAKALOS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try to be 
19 brief. The plaintiffs have prevailed in this case and I don't 
20 have a problem with that. I congratulate them but I need to 
21 put this in prospective. Counsel has been involved in 
22 litigation and maybe they're so personally involved they don't 
23 see things. The first time I became involved on this case was 
24 about two, two and a half months ago when they filed their 
25 motion for fees and the first thing I did was start scratching 
17 
1 my head and the next thing I did is I read the cases and I know 
2 your concern about what transpired here but I think we need to 
3 look at what the Supreme Court said in particular. We are not 
4 Hermes even though the way the plaintiffs have approached this 
5 motion before you is to put us all in the same basket. The 
6 Supreme Court didn't go there. What the Supreme Court said was 
7 that the district court judge who found our actions proper made 
8 a mistake. He was erroneous. It also said on Culbertson One 
9 that the plaintiffs contest the court's interpretation. It 
10 held in Culbertson 1 at paragraph 42, "We conclude the Judge's, 
11 and Ken Jones' decisions were erroneous." They used the term 
12 again regarding the 1070 East Street. The roadway standards 
13 that were applied, the plaintiffs contend that the exception 
14 was erroneous. That's at paragraph 48. The Court, "We 
15 conclude the exceptions were erroneously granted." This is as 
16 to the County. The court did say, "Hermes acted willfully and 
17 deliberately" at paragraph 56 but in its conclusion and the 
18 record, the record says, we made a mistake that's been 
19 rectified. 
20 Even in the Johnson vs. Hermes which is the 
21 Culbertson Two case, the Court again says the County's decision 
22 was erroneous. We made a mistake. So I think the Court can 
23 take some comfort in what the Supreme Court actually found in 
24 this matter in terms of our activities and in terms of issuing 
25 and approving this project. 
18 
1 Now, on the Private Attorney General theory, I think 
2 counsel has a problem when I look at their reply brief at page 
3 7 to 9, I raised the defense that this was a discretionary 
4 action, that we were entitled to immunity and at page 7 to 9 
5 they take the argument, it wasn't discretionary because this is 
6 not affecting basic governmental policymaking just as the Court 
7 focused in its opening statements. I know they're trying to 
8 stretch this Private Attorney General theory and I just don't 
9 see how it can get there because as I pointed out, I know my 
10 dog analogy was simple but it would apply to a setback if we 
11 decide a 20 foot setback is required, the landowner says 18 is 
12 sufficient and the Court finds 19, we've got a fee driven 
13 lawsuit going on. It can be anything as simple as what kind of 
14 plywood is put into a project. We say 3/4 inch, the developer 
15 says half inch, we have a lawsuit and attorney's fees are going 
16 to drive these kinds of cases just like they do in the civil 
17 rights arena. This was not brought as a civil rights case. 
18 It's brought backwards from a 2001 decision until today asking 
19 for a very large sum of money involving the - I'd like to point 
20 out to the Court, not only the action against the County, the 
21 action against Hermes, but the action against a relative that 
22 was involved here. I think it was the Croxfords. I don't know 
23 the case as well as the Court or these folks but I saw three 
24 cases and three fees that they're asking for here. 
25 I want to touch a little bit on this Private Attorney 
19 
1 General theory. The Supreme Court in Stewart relied on the 
2 Sorano decision and as the Court pointed out, that California 
3 cases have been codified on the Private Attorney General 
4 theory. The cases I cited to the court show it's basically a 
5 disfavored approach. Very few if any of the courts have 
6 accepted at Private Attorney General theory in general let 
7 along against a governmental entity. Even on remand of the 
8 public service - back to the Public Service Commission in the 
9 Private Attorney General theory under Barker vs. Public Service 
10 Commission, the court did not go off on the Private Attorney 
11 General theory. It went off on the common fund that the action 
12 of the few rate payers created a multi-million dollar — 
13 THE COURT: But they said that even if it wasn't 
14 enough, even if the common fund wasn't enough that they were 
15 entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Private Attorney 
16 General theory. 
17 MR. TSAKALOS: But they made the award there and 
18 there's no Utah case that goes the opposite direction that 
19 actually has awarded under the Private Attorney General theory. 
20 As a matter of fact, both the parties in this case have cited 
21 the Utahns for Better Dental Health out of Davis County on the 
22 fluoride cases. Judge Dawson denied them attorney's fees that 
23 they sought under this Private AG theory. It was remanded and 
24 in February he issued his other opinion on the remand, again 
25 denying the Private Attorney General theory and in that 
20 
1 particular case, we have health issues involved for literally 
2 thousands and thousands of residents in Davis County and the 
3 judge found that that did not transcend the personal interests 
4 of these particular plaintiffs who brought the action. That 
5 was not sufficient to give them an award of fees and in here, 
6 no matter how you want to argue it, there are two folks that 
7 benefitted from this decision and that's what they sought and 
8 that's what they got. I don't think I can belabor it any more 
9 than that. 
10 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Hunt? 
11 MR. HUNT: Just briefly, Your Honor on the argument 
12 that we're not Hermes, the record is clear that they acted hand 
13 in hand with Hermes throughout this entire process. They got 
14 the contractual indemnification from Hermes, they acceded to 
15 all of Hermes demands and this is what we ended up with. The 
16 court in Culbertson One did condemn the County. 
17 THE COURT: That's certainly the way I read it. 
18 MR. HUNT: Not just Hermes and I don't need to read 
19 the language but it's in paragraph 56 and they said that the 
20 County should be condemned for violating its own ordinances in 
21 this case. 
22 Your Honor, we would just submit that justice and 
23 equity do argue in favor of an award in this case under the 
24 Private Attorney General Doctrine for all the reasons we've 
25 said. We don't think that this benefits just Elaina Culbertson 
21 
1 and Pearl Mybois. We think it vindicated the important side 
2 interest in being able to go to the enforcer of the laws and 
3 require that enforcer to enforce them. We had to undertake 
4 that duty ourselves in this case after we put them on notice. 
5 That's what makes this case extraorcinary. This was not simply 
6 a mistake. This is not simply, we didn't know what you were 
7 claiming. They knew since 1995 and they did it anyway. That's 
8 why the Court condemned their conduct and that's the important 
9 societal interest that we claim is being vindicated, was 
10 vindicated in this case in addition to the fact that these are 
11 public roads and every member of the public from now into the 
12 future that travels on them will be traveling on roads that are 
13 safer because of the result in this case. 
14 Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. If there were a doctrine 
16 either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me 
17 authority to award attorney's fees if the County willfully 
18 violated its own ordinances, I would not hesitate to do that in 
19 this case; however, I remain unconvinced that this is a good 
20 case for application of the Private Attorney General's 
21 Exception to the general rule in Utah which is that I don't 
22 award attorney's fees to prevailing parties. And once again, 
23 the approach that I've taken is to look at the specific results 
24 obtained in the litigation and determine who benefitted I 
25 primarily. Did the public primarily benefit or did these 
22 
1 private litigants primarily benefit? Stewart says, "Courts 
2 have awarded attorney's fees to a party as a Private Attorney 
3 General when vindication of a strong or society important 
4 public policy takes place and the necessary costs of doing so, 
5 transcends the individual's pecuniary interest to an extent 
6 requiring subsidation. Now there was no individual pecuniary 
7 interest in the sense of award of money damages but there was 
8 an individual interest pursued in this case in terms of 
9 improving access to a specific parcel of property and what I 
10 think that language requires me to do is look at the results 
11 and weigh and determine, you know, who ultimately benefitted 
12 from the specific results in this case? Was it these 
13 individual plaintiffs or was it the society as a whole? If it 
14 was even, then I think that - if it was at least even the 
15 Private Attorney General Exception would apply but if you have 
16 a situation where the interests vindicated on behalf of the 
17 individuals, whether pecuniary or not, but the specific results 
18 obtained, whether it benefitted them as compared to society as 
19 a whole, I think it's probably 90/10 in favor of the individual 
20 litigants in this case and because of that, I don't think that 
21 it's fair to say that they were out there representing the 
22 public as a whole and should be reimbursed their attorney's 
23 fees. I just view the exception more narrowly than you do, Mr. 
24 Hunt, even though this is a compelling case to do something to 
25 help out these individuals. I don't see it within my power so 
23 
1 I'm going to deny the Motion for Attorney's fees. I ask the 
2 County to prepare the order if you would please. 
3 MR. TSAKALOS: There's also a Motion to Strike. Do 
4 you want to make any order... 
5 THE COURT: In light of my decision, I don't think 
6 it's worth spending a lot of time on that. For purposes of 
7 your order I've denied the Motion to Strike because I think 
8 it's all things that I can consider in this kind of an 
9 eguitable evaluation. 


















I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned proceedings held before Judge Anthony 
Quinn transcribed by me from a video recording 
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the 
requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages 
to the best of my ability. 




Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2010 
e.~A"f.y4, 2010 
ADDENDUM "B 
DAVID E. YOCOM [USB #3581] 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DONALD H. HANSEN [USB #1332] 
T.J. TSAKALOS [USB # 3289] 
Deputy District Attorneys 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3421 
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622 
Attorneys for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs 
By. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN - 5 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/ VJ^yf 
iputy Clerk' De I 
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and Ken Jones 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON and 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY and KEN JONES, as Director of 
Development Services for Salt Lake County, 
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
FORT UNION ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, and 




PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
and 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
Civil No. 950905166AA 
Judge ANTHONY B. QUTNN 
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The above-entitled civil action came on regularly for oral argument on May 12, 2006 at 
10:a.m. on the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation 
Expenses (filed March 10,2006), and (2) defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portion of 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (filed March 24, 2006). Appearing and arguing on behalf of the 
plaintiffs were their attorneys Jeffrey Hunt and David Reymann of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless. Appearing and arguing on behalf of the defendants were TJ. Tsakalos and Donald H. 
Hansen, Deputy District Attorneys of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. Prior to the 
oral argument, the court had reviewed all the memoranda submitted by the parties' counsel, the cases 
cited therein, and selected portions of the exhibits attached thereto. 
Based upon the arguments, memoranda and authorities presented by the parties and their 
counsel, and finding good cause therefor, the court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows: 
1. With respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation 
Expenses, there is no applicable statute or contractual provision which expressly 
permits the award of fees to the plaintiffs herein. 
2. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party litigation 
rule," the court finds that the rule recognizes that attorney fees may be a measure of 
damages, but the rule is not a substantive basis for awarding attorneys fees to be 
found within the court's inherent equitable authority. 
3. Further, the court finds that there was no "common fund" created by plaintiffs' 
action in this case from which attorney fees can or should be paid. 
4. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party 
litigation rule," the court finds that there was no claim for recovery of damages or 
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fees asserted by plaintiffs in their complaint herein as amended to date. 
5. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private attorney 
general doctrine," in order to grant an award of attorney fees and costs under that 
doctrine, the court must first determine whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the 
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefitted the 
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefitted the public at large. 
6. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," that doctrine is not intended to extend the exception to the 
American rule - which rule restricts awards of attorney fees in civil ligation to cases 
where such an award is expressly authorized by contract or statute - to any case in 
which a citizen's legal action effectively restrains an unreasonable exercise of 
governmental power, even though such a legal action may incidentally result in a 
general, indirect benefit to the public at large. 
1. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and 
obtained relief for their "special private injury," not for vindication of a broad public 
interest. 
8, Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," in analyzing whether the individual plaintiffs, as opposed 
to the general public, primarily benefitted from the prosecution of this action by the 
plaintiffs, the Court finds here that plaintiffs as individuals primarily benefitted from 
the relief they secured, and not the general public. Specifically, the court concludes 
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that approximately ninety percent (90%) of the benefit of the relief obtained inured 
to the plaintiffs as individuals, while approximately ten percent (10%) of the benefit 
may have inured to the general public. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their 
burden under the private attorney general doctrine of showing that the public at large 
primarily benefitted from the plaintiffs' prosecution of this action. 
9. Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Statement of 
Facts is denied. 
THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs and Litigation Expenses is 
DENIED. 
2. Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' 
Statement of Facts is DENIED. 
DATED this C day of / ^ ^ ^ ^ 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
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